The French Revolution was a years-long conflict characterized by absolute monarchical rule. This party sought to stifle the notion of freedom through the ignorance of political representation, steep taxes, and widespread poverty. These conditions gave rise to passion-filled ideas of freedom that could be accomplished through societal reconstruction. Rousseau’s The Social Contract was an influential work within this revolutionary period. It argues for a “social contract” that ensures mutual cooperation between all individuals in the name of freedom. With an analysis of its content, we are able to understand how acting as a universal sovereign can preserve individual, natural freedom through sacrifice in the name of common interest. Still, this concept includes limitations that may diminish the legitimate word of an individual during the voting process and stifle the instinctual basis for the concept itself.
Natural Freedom
Before analyzing the substance of the social contract itself, it is important to highlight the concept of “natural freedom” that brings about its significance. According to Rousseau, “man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau 2), the chains a representation of freedom limited by a form of ruling class. By nature, man is free, with the exception of the authority of a father over his son, so long as the son depends on him for survival (Rousseau 3). Grotius attempts to negate this by claiming this relationship is similar to a ruler/subject relationship in which the ruler cares for his subjects. Rousseau counters this by stating Grotius’ assumption is based on political superiority backed by force, not nature (Rousseau 3). With this, we establish that political authority does not exist in nature and is therefore not a natural right. Rousseau takes this a step further with an assertion that to give up freedom is to give up morality and humanity (Rousseau 7). In this sense, people are only people if they possess the autonomy to pursue their natural freedom. Therefore, it is in the common interest to preserve freedom – the social contract sets out to guarantee this will.
Why enter into the Social Contract?
Rousseau argues that there is a point in nature where people must come together to survive (Rousseau 7). This is where natural freedom is traditionally compromised. It is impossible for everyone’s interests to align in a way that perfectly caters to every individual. The social contract takes this into account – each individual must unconditionally surrender himself to the community. This prompts the question: why would individuals agree to this “surrender” in order to work together? This question is best answered when compared to a reality absent of the social contract. First, since the social contract is the same for everyone, individuals want to make it as easy as possible to follow. This is guaranteed through unanimous consent (Rousseau 10). Without the social contract’s universal rights, some people would find it harder to follow laws tailored to a minority group. Second, since an individual surrenders unconditionally, they share the same rights as the state. In other words, the individual becomes the state by giving up these rights. Without the social contract, the individual would not be part of the state, marking a dissonance between personal and state interests. Third, the social contract ensures that no one is above anyone else (Rousseau 20). In this way, people ensure the principle of equality under the contract. Without the social contract, a ruling body might reign supreme and prioritize its interests over the common individual. For these reasons, it is advantageous for people to work together under the social contract.
Freedom under the Social Contract
Now that we have established the importance of preserving freedom and why individuals enter into a contract to do so, we can examine how one is still considered free under the social contract. This is best answered with Rousseau’s concept of the sovereign. In a contract based on the forfeiture of rights, it may be difficult to visualize how freedom is preserved. This is answered with the concept of natural versus civil liberty. A certain degree of natural liberty is lost as man loses his ability to follow his instincts freely (Rousseau 7). Yet, civil liberty is gained in return, where he is granted morality. Alternatively, if individuals “did retain some rights” (Rousseau 12), they would possess a shred of superiority in areas where other individuals do not possess such rights. Rousseau cites this as a catalyst for tyranny, where everyone sees himself as “his own judge on all” (Rousseau 12). With the contract, “since each person gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one” (Rousseau 12). Essentially, if everyone has no rights, then everyone also has every right. This active body of rights is deemed the sovereign. The sovereign guarantees individual protection by means of this common enforcement, essentially guaranteeing the same degree of freedom found in nature. A man is a slave only to his own will, and is therefore free. In this way, the sovereign is a well-oiled freedom machine in every discipline.
The statement suggesting members of the general will will act together and freely on the basis of common interest is true. By its very definition, the general will encourages a collaborative body that makes decisions based on the most advantageous medium for exercising freedom. This is best exemplified by a hypothetical scenario. Here, one hundred people participate in a social contract. Fifty-one individuals exhibit distaste for dogs based on their high degree of maintenance, while the other forty-nine adore them. As a result, a law is passed banning the ownership of all dogs. This scenario fits all aspects of the above definition. Since a majority of the social contract favors the banishment of dog ownership, it is worthwhile for the dog-lovers to sacrifice their instinctual love of dogs in order to preserve the common interest. Since this decision is made through the sovereign body of which they are a part of, the dog-lovers ultimately make this decision on their own accord. In Rousseau’s eyes, the alternative of this decision is more damaging to freedom (Rousseau 12). If the dog-lovers were to insist on keeping their pets, it would undermine the stability of the contract. The act would set a precedent in which dog-lovers communicate that they are superior in the realm of dog-ownership legality, which, in turn, would permit the anti-dog group to decree areas in which they are supreme. The common interest is thus violated and will soon evolve to support the group with the most power (Rousseau 12). In this sense, it makes sense for the dog-lovers to concede to the majority in order to uphold the contract. Yet, it is important to mention that the social contract is set up so that such polarizing conflicts are rare. The will of the collective is meant to favor the easiest solution that is most likely to benefit everyone.
Problems
While the above scenario exemplifies the collectivistic nature of the social contract’s voting system, it is important to mention its interpretation of the minority voter. The above system implies that the minority is “mistaken” – their personal instincts have not aligned with the general public’s, causing them to appear inferior in comparison. Rousseau even cites the minority as having “made a mistake” (Rousseau 56) in his assessment of the general will’s instincts. This statement has been a point of contention in The Social Contract. During the voting process, one is encouraged to vote against his instincts towards what he feels the common good would want – he fills the social contract definition of “mistaken” when he does otherwise (Rousseau 56). In the context of Rousseau’s contract, this definition of “mistaken” is accurate. The man has voted against the general will and was quite literally incorrect in his interpretation of what the general will truly desired. However, it raises the question: was the man inherently wrong for voting against his true instincts? The nature of the social contract is meant to cultivate this instinctual drive to the best of its ability. By placing the will of the collective before individualistic instincts, it bends these very instincts to the will of the public, ultimately stifling individuality and unique instincts that were once the essence of freedom. This concept makes its way into Plato’s Kallipolis. His city prevents the notion of one’s word being “wrong” through the principle of specialization. Here, individuals are cultivated from birth to occupy the role they are best suited for. This ensures that everyone respects their expertise in their respective area (Plato 370a). For example, auxiliaries are trusted with conquest and the preservation of the soul’s spirited part (Plato 403c). Here, individuality is valued over a collective opinion, a sharp contrast to the social contract. In this sense, Rousseau’s criticism of a lack of accordance with the general will feeds his conceptual definition, but fails to account for damaging byproducts.
Conclusion
In the end, the social contract seeks to preserve the “natural freedom” connected to an individual’s degree of morality. This reality requires the sacrifice of this freedom itself in order to ensure the highest level of compliance with the contract. The sovereign describes the active body of rights that everyone submits themselves to. Yet, it can also stifle the very freedom that it seeks to protect, a concept Plato’s principle of specialization addresses. Nevertheless, the social contract marks a radical breakthrough in freedom during a time period characterized by its scarcity. Its relevance today is a testament to the timeless nature of Rousseau’s analysis of human nature.
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Works Cited
Douglass, Frederick. “Chapter 10.” Life and Times of Frederick Douglass: His Early Life as a Slave, His Escape from Bondage, and His Complete History: An Autobiography, Gramercy Books, New York, 1993.
Hegel, G.W.F., et al. “Lordship and Bondage.” The Phenomenology of Spirit, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, 2019.
Plato. Plato’s The Republic. New York :Books, Inc., 1943.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Social Contract. 1828 PR, 2022.