In 2016, the U.S. and several other world powers reached an agreement with Iran over its controversial nuclear program. The deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), removed $100 billion worth of sanctions from Iran in exchange for its commitment to decreased uranium production and quarterly inspections of its nuclear facilities. In 2018, the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran’s oil and banking sectors . Since then, Iran has enriched its uranium to 90 percent (weapons-grade level) and continuously violates United Nations inspections. Iran’s rial has fallen significantly against the U.S. dollar and multinational corporations are wary of conducting business within Iran for fear of U.S. prosecution. This precis seeks to explore the dependent variable of the U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement in 2018. This dependent variable is productive to our study as it is a finite event that involves instances such as nuclear bargaining, most of which can be applied within each hypothesis. The first possible independent variable can be explained through the lens of offensive realism, where the U.S. sought to maintain its global hegemonic status by seizing a revisionist opportunity for power redistribution in the Middle East. The second can be explained through a constructivist lens, where the U.S. sought to reaffirm its identity as an unpredictable power and penalize Iran’s violation of bad faith norms. This will be followed with additional points of evidence required to develop this study further. A case study of the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty will also be provided in order to parallel the JCPOA event to an additional offensive realist event, followed by a conclusion. Overall, this precis will walk through the offensive realist theory’s focus on uncertainty, revisionism, and power maximization and the constructivist theory’s emphasis on identity, norms, and socialization in order to demonstrate why the former best explains the U.S.’s decision in 2018.
In order to examine the first independent variable, we must dissect the three core elements of offensive realism and apply them to the U.S.’s international strategy. The first element is the principle of uncertainty. States desire the smallest possible margin of uncertainty over others’ intentions in a bid to maintain a higher degree of control. International Studies Fellow Shiping Tang claims this gives way to “…states [assuming] the worst about each others’ intentions”, exacerbated by the fact that there is no central authority on the international stage. With these parameters, we can deduce that a state will engage in offensive tactics as soon as it is able to do so. This can be quantified as the function , where is the probability of a state posing a threat against itself:
Pt= ƒ(a state’s offensive capabilities x its resolve to do harm).
In this sense, possibility, rather than probability, compels states to plan and act. We can apply this formula to the U.S.’s decision to leave the JCPOA. The U.S. experienced an increasing degree of uncertainty in the events leading up to May 2018. Moments after his decision to withdraw the U.S. from the deal, President Trump released a statement that outlined secret Iranian missile programs, unmonitored uranium development, and covert terrorist funding. Here, uncertainty over Iranian activity under the agreement led the U.S. to believe Iran’s offensive capabilities and resolve to do harm had reached lengths that could not be mitigated by the JCPOA. In other words, Iran’s Pt had increased in the U.S.’s eyes, prompting it to take drastic action.
The second key element of offensive realism is revisionism, which goes hand-in-hand with aggression. A revisionist state seeks to “increase [its] power and to improve [its] position in the international system. An assumption of this model is that the international system is so anarchical that revisionism becomes orthodox policy; the extension of power is the best mode of survival. With this, we can deduce offense is the best defense. For example, in a study of wars conducted between 1815 and 1980, the initiator won 39 out of 63 wars, or 60 percent. Expansionist policies are therefore rational and a norm in an anarchical system. Any country that does not capitalize on an opportunity to reshape the power distribution in its favor is an “anomaly.” This rivals the defensive realist concept of “status quo,” where states are satisfied as long as they are aptly defended. Yet, it is worth noting that there are some instances in which a state has not taken advantage of a revisionist opportunity, even what it had the means to do so. For example, the U.S. annexed several territories from the mid 19th to 20th century, yet still held a small presence on the international stage. Here, a state may gain the international presence to institute revisionist policies, but lack the “free hand” to align its resources with its goals. With all of this in mind, it is clear the U.S. exhibited a revisionist mindset during its decision in 2018 to leave the JCPOA. If the U.S. had stayed in the JCPOA, it would have been a complacent, status quo state that was satisfied its security concerns were mitigated. Had the U.S. adopted this view, it would have looked the other way as long as Iran refrained from uranium enrichment. Yet, the U.S. chose to seek an aggressive policy under seemingly peaceful circumstances in order to pursue a higher degree of revisionism, a hallmark of offensive realism. The U.S. pursued this policy in order to extend its power within what it saw as an anarchical system. Per President Trump, the deal gave a “regime of great terror” billions of dollars at a point when the U.S. had maximum leverage. In this sense, where other P5 countries saw a worthwhile agreement, the U.S. saw an offensive deal rooted in a dangerous sense of complacency. Further, the U.S. sought to leverage its abandonment of the JCPOA in order to gain more power within the bargaining models of other countries. The U.S. decision to leave the agreement occurred a month before President Trump was to meet North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un to discuss the dissolution of the communist state’s nuclear arsenal. The administration believed a “tough line with Iran would strengthen [its] hand” as the meeting neared. Here, a third-party country more capable of nuclear devastation caused the U.S. to use Iran as a pawn in a larger negotiation. In this sense, offensive realist strategies are not restricted to a single bargaining model and can be used to bridge them together. Additionally, the U.S. feared sanction relief helped Iran aid illicit activities, including terrorist collusion and political corruption. Iran’s compliance also had an expiration date – “sunset clauses” would void the JCPOA’s provisions in 2030. These conditions made it unacceptable for the U.S. to root itself in satisfaction. Although the threat of uranium production was low under the agreement, the U.S.’s revisionist mindset prompted it to take action regardless.
The third and final element of offensive realism is relative power maximization which falls in line with hegemonic status. Here, it matters not that a state is ultra-powerful, but that it is more powerful than other states. With this, Political Scientist Peter Toft details two ways in which states gain power: direct attempts and checking aggressors. Direct attempts include war, which eliminates rival states to improve security, blackmail, which forces concessions, and bait-and-bleed, which allows an instigator state to get stronger while other states fight. Checking aggressors includes balancing the threat between members of an alliance, bandwagoning with a stronger state, and buck-passing, where a threat is handed off between states. The latter can be understood in the context of the U.S.’s 2018 decision. Here, the U.S. buck-passed the responsibility of checking Iran’s nuclear power to the other members of P5 when it left the agreement. As a result, the European countries were forced to put forth the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) to maintain Iranian nuclear compliance in lieu of U.S. support. According to Toft, the U.S. was a likely candidate to buck pass as it was separated from Iran by a more significant natural barrier than the other P5 countries. As such, the farther a great power is from a rival, the less likely they are to check its power. In this sense, the U.S.’s decision to buck-pass Iran was a logical move. By doing so, the U.S. was able to “sit safely on the bench, while the balance of power [shifted] to its advantage.” Theoretically, the U.S. could safely dominate Iran with economic sanctions all while ensuring international security. Yet, it strategically used the power of other countries to achieve the same goal. It is worth noting that this U.S. policy also fell into a pitfall outlined by Toft where the buck-catcher is defeated, leaving the buck-passer alone to face the aggressor. After the U.S. left the JCPOA, Iran “defeated” the remaining P5 buck-catchers by ramping up its uranium enrichment process and refusing facility inspections. In this sense, the U.S. is once again faced with nuclear security concerns as predicted by Toft. With this, we conclude the analysis of offensive realism’s three major components of uncertainty, revisionism, and power maximization in the context of the U.S.’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA.
In order to examine the second hypothesis’ constructivist interpretation of the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, we must once again examine the theory’s core facets and apply them to our scenario. Constructivism as a whole emphasizes subjective nature that drives the international system through a medium of socialization. The first core component of constructivist theory is identity. Per Political Scientist Maxym Alexandrov, a state’s identity is the guiding force behind its interests and behavior. Identity, in turn, is determined by state identity politics that seek to “reinforce, weaken, or redefine” it in order to influence foreign policy. Internal shaping of identity politics is most often positive – intrinsic U.S. foreign policies condemning the spread of communism during the Vietnam and Cold War, for example, contributed to its national identity as a proponent of democracy. External shaping, on the other hand, can be used for malicious reasons, exemplified through other countries’ label of the U.S. as “imperialist” over its disproportionate involvement in proxy wars at the time. Now that the parameters for a state’s identity and the factors that influence it have been defined, we can analyze its effectiveness as a tool in strategic interaction. Here, it is imperative to examine state identity’s relationship with rationality:
Being rational translates into being predictable, which is often a crucial disadvantage in the strategic interaction…State identity can thus be an instrument to convince others that one is not rational over certain issues.
In the context of the U.S.’s 2018 decision, it would have been rational for the U.S. to remain in the JCPOA – after all, it was a P5-backed agreement rooted in common U.S. interest to mitigate Middle Eastern security concerns. Yet, the U.S. still pulled out – by doing so, the U.S. facilitated its identity as an unpredictable force and strengthened its position within the bargaining model. This decision is supported by the notion that “U.S. military capabilities do not get magically transformed into the control over outcomes” – a hegemony must strike the balance between rule by consent and rule by power. In this sense, the U.S.’s decision to strengthen its identity over the militaristic domination of Iran represents a move towards ruling by consent, rather than power.
The second element of constructivist theory that can help us understand the U.S.’s decision is norms. There are three aspects to the creation and diffusion of norms: normative behavior, where existing norms influence a community, socialization, where an existing or new norm travels beyond a community, and normative emergence, which marks the moment a norm is shared by more than one conscious mind. In this sense, norms directly rival rationalist or quantifiable approaches to international relations as they are products of human subjectivity. Whereas other methods of foreign policy attempt to maximize utility, a normative method focuses on what an actor “should do.” The U.S.’s 2018 decision helps introduce a double-sided argument for the functionality of norms in foreign policy. On one hand, it can be argued that Iran violated essential norms that defined the U.S.’s global presence. The Trump administration’s statement regarding its withdrawal from the JCPOA labeled Iran as a “liar”, “sinister,” and a proponent of “malign behavior.” In this sense, Iran violated a major U.S. norm that condemns bad faith. Therefore, it made sense for the U.S. to leave the agreement on these grounds. Paradoxically, this instance also illegitimizes the U.S.’s bad faith norm. The U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and its subsequent reimplementation of sanctions after it had previously lifted them represents a violation of its own norm. Although the JCPOA’s “snapback” clause enables states to withdraw, normative principles still dictate that a U.S. snapback is hypocritical within the context of bad faith. In this sense, the U.S.’s 2018 decision highlights a new, “self-destructive” aspect of norms that can arise when a norm’s employment simultaneously inhibits its intrinsic value.
A final aspect of constructivism is the concept of socialization. Socialization is when actors “internalize norms and standards of behavior by acting in social structures.” This term is best demonstrated through tracking the concept of “nuclear taboo.” The phenomenon seeks to make sense of why no nuclear weapons have been used in war since 1945 and whether to attribute this to rationalist or constructivist principles. In the past, non-nuclear states have attacked nuclear states and paid no mind to the possibility of a nuclear counterattack. A constructivist approach attributes this illogical phenomenon to the development of an aversive culture surrounding nuclear weapons. Here, a previously established norm entered the subconscious by means of socialization and thus became habitual. With this, we can factor the concept of nuclear taboo into the U.S.’s decision to withdraw from JCPOA. As Iran continued to compromise the U.S.’s identity and norms, it was pressured to find a solution. The concept of nuclear taboo dictates a state has an aversion to using nuclear deterrence. If we combine these two facts, the U.S.’s decision to leave the JCPOA risked nothing while also effectively restoring its constructivist principles, as nuclear taboo dictates Iran would never use a nuclear weapon regardless. In this sense, the U.S. used this constructivist principle to help them reach this conclusion. With this, we conclude our examination of constructivism and its three essential components of identity, norms, and socialization in the context of the U.S.’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA.
With the establishment of two major hypotheses for why the U.S. decided to withdraw from the JCPOA in 2018, we can deduce why the first hypothesis and its focus on offensive realism fits the question more appropriately. The answer to this lies largely in the U.S.’s position as a global hegemon. Hegemonic stability theory dictates a single dominant state ensures the highest degree of openness and stability in the world. This theory has deep roots in global security, which offensive realism seeks to maximize through aggression. Constructivism, on the other hand, allows security to take a backseat to world image in an attempt to flow with anarchy rather than capitalize on it. This method can be effective where the diffusion of norms and identities is advantageous – yet it is largely ineffective at hegemonic levels where security is of utmost importance. With this, we can deconstruct areas in the U.S.’s 2018 withdrawal that constructivism fails to encapsulate. For example, although the U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA could be seen as a way to enhance its unpredictable identity under constructivism, the move simultaneously reshaped power distribution within the Middle East and P5 alike. This aggressive move is better understood in the context of offensive realism as it places a larger emphasis on security than it does identity. Historically, when the U.S. has placed a larger emphasis on identity diffusion over aggressive realist policies, security is consequently compromised and vice versa:
Complete security – that is, the complete absence of threat or danger – even if it was possible, would destroy a necessary precondition for politicized group identity.
Since we have defined security as essential to hegemonic stability theory, and therefore to this event, it is reasonable to assume that U.S. usage of constructivism is largely inapplicable as a favored U.S. strategy. Additionally, it is extremely unlikely the U.S. would hedge its entire security on the constructivist concept of nuclear taboo. The U.S.’s decision to refrain from a nuclear war with Iran, therefore, was most likely rooted in offensive realist principles:
There is a strategic logic (of consequences) behind nuclear nonuse, since breaking the nonuse tradition would set a bad precedent resulting in further proliferation and use by others.
In this sense, the U.S.’s decision was, once again, likely rooted in logic rather than normative background. For these reasons, it is likely that offensive realism was the exercised strategy during the U.S.’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA.
In order to further develop and determine which international relations theory was used in the context of the U.S’s 2018 event, it would be useful to collect a few key points of evidence. The first would be economic data as a result of reimposed U.S. sanctions. The severity of harm to domestic U.S. industries as a result of the sanction could help determine whether or not sanctions were imposed for the purpose of aggressive, economic dominance or to diffuse norms in the name of constructivism. If domestic industries were harmed significantly, it would suggest the U.S. truly valued cultural diffusion over its hegemonic status; if industries were not affected, it would suggest the U.S. imposed sanctions to gain an advantage under an offensive realist policy. Aside from this, it would be useful to include the U.S.’s 2020 assassination of Iranian Commander Qassem Soleimani on grounds that he was “planning an imminent attack.” This detail would contribute strongly to the first, offensive realist hypothesis, as it demonstrates the U.S.’s “strike first” nature under this theory. Finally, it would be helpful to have survey data on public opinion towards the U.S.’s decision to withdraw. This could help create a more complex argument that focuses on the role of public discourse and its effectiveness within each theory.
The U.S.’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA is similar to its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The U.S. originally signed the ABM Treaty in 1972 during the Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The treaty limited nuclear defense systems to just 100 interceptors per country in an effort to control the arms race between the two states. Such limitation was speculated to reduce the need for new weapons to overcome “any defense that the other might deploy.” In this sense, both sides became more vulnerable to attacks. Paradoxically, this deterred each state from launching an attack on the other, as it would guarantee a retaliatory strike that would lead to its destruction. In 2002, George Bush argued the U.S. and Russia no longer needed to uphold a relationship based on their ability to destroy one another and consequently withdrew from the treaty. Per Bush, doing so would allow the U.S. to develop better defense against rogue-state ballistic missile attacks from entities like North Korea. In Russia’s eyes, the U.S.’s withdrawal could spur a second arms race as it upset the scale of vulnerability between the two countries. As a result, Russia withdrew from the START II treaty which limited the amount of nuclear warheads that could be produced by each country. Since 2002, the U.S. has allocated $142 billion for missile defense systems and expanded its capacities well beyond those outlined in the treaty. In this sense, the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty and the JCPOA alike in order to avoid compromising security and gain a higher foothold in the nuclear landscape. Additionally, each withdrawal was seen as a major setback to international efforts at arms control and non-proliferation. The U.S.’s departure from each treaty prompted an immediate increase in nuclear technology from Russia and Iran. Such decisions also placed considerable strains on trust between the U.S. and other signatories. The U.S.’s JCPOA decision undermined the P5 countries in the same way its ABM treaty departure lowered its status as a trustworthy cosignatory for Russia. With this, it is important to analyze why the U.S. made a controversial decision to leave the ABM Treaty in the name of national security, a phenomenon best explained through the lens of offensive realism.
The first principle of offensive realism that can explain this event is the concept of the security dilemma. Here, a positive feedback loop is created when the security actions of one state causes another state to increase its own security in response. Yet, in this event, the U.S. voided its security dilemma with Russia in order to satiate another security dilemma with rogue-nations. In this sense, we can examine the duality of the security dilemma under offensive realism. Offensive realists “argue that states are compelled to make worst-case assumptions” about one another’s intentions. Under this model, the U.S. assumed Russia would increase its nuclear arsenal in response to the U.S.’s enhanced defense system, thus increasing security concerns. However, at the same time, the U.S. also left itself vulnerable to attacks from states other than Russia, potentially contributing to a larger security dilemma:
Without effective national defenses, each superpower remained vulnerable, even at reduced or low offensive force holdings, to the other’s nuclear weapons.
At this point, the U.S. had to weigh two security dilemmas – it determined the necessity of rogue-state security outweighed the cost of an additional arms race with Russia and consequently reneged on the deal. A similar dual security dilemma occurred in the U.S.’s decision to leave the JCPOA. In this case, the first dilemma was the surface level threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The second dilemma was Iran’s potential bad faith under the deal, in which they could use lifted tariffs to further uranium enrichment programs. The U.S. deemed the latter as the more pressing security dilemma and thus reneged on the deal, similar to its actions under the ABM Treaty. Both events, therefore, highlight the hierarchy of security dilemmas that prompt states to choose one or the other.
A second principle of offensive realism that can explain this event is strategic autonomy, which falls in line with the previously-discussed concept of power maximization. It is important to first understand why the U.S. entered into the ABM treaty in the first place in 1972. The treaty is analogous to a Western standoff, where both parties are required to lay down their firearms. Now, both are equally vulnerable to each other, but also to other parties that had not agreed to lower their guns. In this sense, a valuable property of power maximization was violated, where the “autonomy of the state is a prerequisite for the achievement of all other ends.” When the U.S. withdrew from the ABM treaty, it prioritized strategic flexibility over a multilateral agreement that would limit its military capabilities. In this sense, the U.S. sacrificed a degree of nuclear stability in order to reshape the geopolitical landscape on its own terms and take back its “gun.” It is important to examine the context of the treaty withdrawal as well in order to further understand its roots in offensive realism. The U.S.’s official withdrawal came just months after the September 11th attacks, where policymakers grappled with the threat of rogue-states and terrorist organizations rather than the threat of a great power war. The playing field had shifted – in order to adapt, the U.S. had to change its strategy to maintain its hegemonic status and thus reneged on the ABM treaty. This is similar to the U.S.’s reasoning for leaving the JCPOA. During this period, the U.S. had collected evidence that the Iranian regime used JCPOA money to “fund a military buildup and fund terrorist proxies, such as Hizballah and Hamas.” This occurred at a time of unrest in the Middle East, particularly among militaristic groups in Iraq. The U.S., therefore, was forced to adapt to potential security breaches from smaller, rogue groups and saw it fit to withdraw from an agreement that could aid their activity. In this sense, the U.S. sought to preserve its hegemonic status by withdrawing from restrictive agreements like the ABM treaty and the JCPOA, thus illustrating its offensive realist strategy towards shifting geopolitical variables.
A final aspect of the ABM treaty we can observe is the offensive realist concept of unpredictability. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the U.S. withdrew from the treaty for reasons other than “rogue-state security.” In his announcement of the U.S.’s withdrawal from the treaty President Bush left out relevant information about the country’s defense system:
Bush made no mention of the current US offensive nuclear arsenal of around 7000 warheads – surely a sufficient force to deter even the most hardened terrorist or disagreeable state leader.
This raises a question of whether the U.S. even needed an ABM defense system to ward off potential threats from rogue states. Rather, it could have been acting under a revisionist mindset, choosing to leave the comfort of the new world order in order to reinforce its unpredictable nature. We can observe similar behavior from the U.S. earlier on in this study. It cited terrorist groups from which it could aptly defend itself against as a reason for its departure from the JCPOA. In reality, however, the U.S. might have truly left the treaty in order to aggressively reshape power distribution in line with offensive realism.
An examination of the ABM treaty withdrawal’s consequences can help us predict long-term effects of the U.S.’s departure from the JCPOA. In the years since the U.S.’s landmark decision, relations between Russia and the U.S. have deteriorated significantly. “In the view of many in Moscow, this all began with the shock of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.” Events such as NATO expansion, bombing in Libya, and the Bush administration’s disdain towards Russia all stemmed from the landmark withdrawal from the ABM treaty. As a result, Russia has developed exotic nuclear systems “in a response to unconstrained U.S. ballistic missile defense programs.” This event therefore highlights detrimental products of offensive realist policies. In an effort to mitigate threats from smaller, non-hegemonic states and groups, the U.S. upset the power balance between itself and a legitimate world power. This shows that, in many instances, it is impossible for aggressive policies to satiate problems on two fronts. The U.S. chose to pursue an offensive realist policy on the rogue state front, possibly an effect of recency bias in the aftermath of September 11th. As a result, it left room for Russia to violate the “new world order.” The U.S., therefore, was aggressive when it had the chance, but left a gaping hole in its aftermath. If we equate this instance to the U.S.’s decision to leave the JCPOA in 2018, similar effects could be observed. Ongoing conflict in the Middle East around the time of the U.S.’s departure from the JCPOA likely played a role in the decision, similar to the September 11th attack’s influence on the ABM treaty withdrawal. Additionally, U.S. dismissal from the agreement caused Iran to increase its arms production and enrich its uranium to weapons-grade levels. Alternatively, the U.S.’s “buck pass” might have also contributed to instability among the other P5 signatories, thus affecting world powers in the same way as Russia in the context of the ABM treaty. With this in mind, we can hypothesize that if the U.S’s withdrawal from the JCPOA follows the same trajectory as its ABM treaty termination, it could spur an increase in Iranian nuclear technology. Additionally, other states may increase their nuclear capabilities in response, ultimately violating the new world order. In this sense, the dissolution of the ABM treaty set the groundwork for a potential arms race decades later.
As such, the U.S.’s withdrawal from the ABM treaty was largely similar to its withdrawal from the JCPOA. Further, the U.S.’s ABM treaty fallout closely followed offensive realist concepts such as security dilemmas and strategic autonomy. Therefore, the U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA can be best understood in the context of offensive realism.
Overall, the dependent variable of U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA came as a shock to many. Through an analysis of both offensive realist and constructivist hypotheses, we are able to identify why offensive realism best encapsulates the event. Offensive realism is rooted in aggressive policies that seek to mitigate uncertainty in order to extend a state’s means of influence by means of relative power. This is useful in understanding why the U.S. pursued an aggressive policy, seemingly at random. Constructivism is rooted in the diffusion of ideas, where ideas, rather than logical strategies, shape the political landscape by means of identities and norms. This hypothesis was facilitated with the discussion of Iran’s bad faith norms and nuclear taboo phenomenon. With this, we were able to determine that offensive realism’s focus on security closely aligned with the U.S.’s hegemonic status, and therefore best explained the event. Our claim was honed further using a case study of the U.S.’s withdrawal from the ABM treaty, an event that closely mirrors its withdrawal from the JCPOA. This event was determined to be an offensive realist event, thus demonstrating how the primary event is consistent with offensive realist theory as well. Additional research variables that could enhance this argument were discussed.
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