The Russo-Ukrainian War marks the most recent war in history. Yet, it is the product of age-old conflicts that date back to the dissolution of the USSR. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea marks the first finite development in the brewing conflict. Here, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to protect irredentist Ukranians in the Donbas region (Clinton), which gave Russia a reason to invade and eventually annex Crimea. Now, Russia has invaded in a similar fashion, citing Ukraine’s affinity to join NATO as a reason for invasion. With this recent development, the U.S. is faced with a sensitive role in the conflict. In order to reach an eventual resolution regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Biden administration must walk a crucial tightrope between strengthening Ukraine’s status as a U.S. affiliate and displaying a front that communicates NATO’s willingness to renegotiate with Russia. More specifically, the U.S. should fully adopt Ukraine as a non-NATO ally, while also strategically revising Russia’s two draft treaties.
Why does Ukraine need extra protection?
When analyzing the steps both Russia and Ukraine must take to reach an agreement, it is important to address Russia’s past commitment issues. While Russia has reneged on multiple Ukrainian deals in the past, the most notable surrounds the Budapest Memorandum. In this doctrine, Ukraine agreed to dispose of the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the dissolution of the USSR in exchange for a Russian pledge to respect Ukrainian borders. Yet, as seen in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and now again with the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia has taken advantage of Ukraine’s abandonment of a valuable bargaining chip. This historical pattern communicates Ukraine’s need for additional protection if it were to engage in peace talks (Blake).
Solution one: Major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status
This poses the question: how can the U.S. make sure Ukraine can safely engage in such peace talks with Russia? One solution could be adopting Ukraine as a major non-NATO ally (MNNA). Major non-NATO status entails a country to multiple “military and economic privileges” from the U.S. without the guarantee of a mutual defense pact (Khylko). More specifically, this will allow for a higher allocation of military and intelligence aid to Ukraine. As an MNNA, Ukraine would be able to stockpile much-needed U.S. military equipment on its territory. This would allow longer-range ammunition for M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (Himars), which Ukraine has yet to receive from the United States (India). Ukraine could also potentially receive U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missiles under MNNA status, which are currently being withheld by the United States (Martinez). Non-NATO ally status also grants access to depleted uranium ammunition (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs), which is needed in Ukraine’s Howitzer guns and anti-tank weapons (India). In addition to this, Ukraine will have increased access to the Pentagon to strategize its war games (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs). These collective benefits of MNNA status will drastically reinforce Ukraine’s facilities and increase its sphere of influence within the bargaining model.
Why MNNA over non-intervention?
Major non-NATO status lies within the middle of two other potential U.S. resolutions: complete non-intervention or a designation of Ukraine as a full NATO state. A non-NATO alliance is superior to complete non-intervention for a few reasons. If the U.S. were to seize or reduce all aid to Ukraine, there is an increased risk of Russian domination over the trans-Atlantic realm. This includes trade, where $1.5 trillion is exchanged annually within the economy (Liadze et al.). Domestic industries like Alabama’s Mercedes plant or South Carolina’s BMW factory depend on a “U.S.-led order reigning supreme in Europe” in order to sustain jobs and uphold the U.S. economy (Northam). It is also important to consider the humanitarian issues Russia raises in its invasion of Ukraine. An investigative team sent by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted “clear patterns of international humanitarian law violations” in the country, including strikes on maternity hospitals and child shelters (Kelly). For these reasons, it is imperative that the U.S. does not yield to the inhumane precedent Russia is setting in Europe. A non-interventionist policy is a step in the direction of acceptance towards these practices, which the U.S. cannot support as a proponent of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
Why MNNA over full NATO status?
Major non-NATO status also poses considerable benefits over a full indoctrination of Ukraine into NATO. Full NATO status comes at a risk the U.S. is not prepared to take. In his push for NATO membership, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has repeatedly emphasized his vision for a “heavily militarized Ukraine” with armed forces in “all institutions, supermarkets, [and] cinemas” (Rubinstein). Analysts have donned Ukraine as a state whose “national identity would…project U.S. power against Russia” should it join NATO (Rubinstein). These claims would place the U.S. in a vulnerable range of entrapment if Ukraine was fully indoctrinated into NATO. With a guaranteed defense pact with the U.S., Ukraine could engage in more provocative behavior towards Russia, ultimately running the risk of dragging the U.S. into a direct conflict with Russia. Further, full NATO status has a larger chance of provoking Russia into nuclear war. Putin has repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine’s affinity to join NATO is a major cause of the Russian invasion (Rubinstein). Simply put, if Ukraine were to perform the single action that Russia advised against, Putin would have a green light for a full-scale and possibly nuclear invasion of Ukraine. If Ukraine were to acquire MNNA status, however, they would lack the Article 5 component of the agreement. While this development would still likely irritate Russia, there is a lesser chance that it would lead to an aggressive reaction, simply because of the absence of the Article 5 component. For this reason, the benefits of MNNA status compared to its risks outweigh those of full NATO status.
Russia’s POV
With this in mind, we must also consider Russia’s perspective and what it will take for them to end the war. To do this, it is imperative to understand why Putin puts forth such a deterministic front. Putin’s Communist Russia can be classified as an autocracy, where a small party exercises power with minimal constraints. As a result, he is not held accountable for his militaristic advances, allowing him to gamble for resurrection even after heavy Russian losses. It is also important to note that Ukraine’s prior commitment to join NATO would significantly decrease Russia’s influence within the bargaining model. If Ukraine were to join NATO, they would possess a first-strike advantage in Russia’s eyes. This stems from the fact that Ukraine could attempt to take back Crimea and invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, a reality that Putin himself addressed earlier this year (Starkey). This would spur a global conflict in which Russia is pitted against the entirety of NATO. Therefore, from the Russian perspective, the Ukrainian invasion might be viewed as a preventative war.
Solution two: U.S. treaties with Russia
For these reasons, it is important that the U.S. approach Russia with a treaty that takes these factors into account. Yet, the U.S. must also remain firm on tough-to-swallow contentions in order to maintain its pre-war standing with Russia. Russia has already put forth two draft agreements: a NATO-Russia Agreement and a U.S.-Russia Treaty, which contain both negotiation points and blatant issues.
NATO-Russia Agreement
The NATO-Russia Agreement features Russia’s aggressive NATO reformation policy, stating NATO members would “commit to no further enlargement of the alliance…in particular Ukraine” (Pifer). It also outlines a withdrawal of NATO troops from neighboring countries to Russia, with no requirement for Russian troops to be withdrawn. Finally, it bars intermediate-range missile deployment in regions in range of Russia (Pifer). These policies on their own demand actions that NATO and the U.S. will never be receptive to. However, they provide sufficient starting points for negotiations within the treaty. The agreement’s primary clause demanding no further NATO expansion can be negotiated with a middle-ground resolution. The U.S. should propose a policy in which they guarantee Ukraine will not join NATO within a certain amount of time (for example, 30 years). Yet, the U.S. would still reserve the right to indoctrinate Ukraine into NATO after this allotted time period. This resolution would allow the U.S. to maintain its pre-war standing with Russia, as Ukraine was not being heavily considered as a NATO candidate by the U.S. in the first place. Yet, it would still allow NATO to preserve its “open door” policy. The agreement’s second clause calling for a withdrawal of NATO troops should also be amended. In exchange for a removal of NATO forces near Russian borders, the U.S. and NATO should demand a removal of Russian forces near NATO countries, namely forces in Belarus and Romania. This will help NATO demonstrate that Russia cannot create a crisis and use it to advance a policy that they were already seeking before without sacrifice. This same policy should apply to Russia’s intermediate-range missile clause, where Russian missiles near NATO countries would be removed and vice versa. Although Russia is not guaranteed to respond enthusiastically to these reforms, it is important that NATO and the U.S. hold firm on their resolutions.
Draft U.S. Russia Treaty
The draft U.S.-Russia Treaty, on the other hand, contains many proposals that the Biden administration is unlikely to consider. Among these are Russian calls to limit the amount of U.S. warships and bombers that can operate over international waters and for all nuclear arms to be placed on national soil (Pifer). The first proposal is extremely unlikely to pass in Washington, as the U.S. is reluctant to compromise its own security in the wake of a Russian-initiated conflict. Russia’s second proposal to keep all nuclear weapons on one’s own national territory has potential for negotiation, but not within the draft treaty. This issue should be debated in another nuclear relations forum, something the Biden administration has sought to do for a while (Pifer). In the end, it is unsafe for the U.S. to gamble with its own safety in order to assist a non-NATO country. Further, if the U.S. was to concede to Russia’s proposals, it would set a precedent in which Russia’s initiation of a conflict grants them leverage on the political scale. Therefore, in regards to the draft U.S.-Russia Treaty, the U.S. should not concede to Russia’s demands.
Conclusion
In the end, the Biden administration should take two concrete steps towards addressing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It should consider granting Ukraine Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status in order to make sure it can safely negotiate with Russia. Non-NATO status entitles Ukraine to increased militaristic, financial, and intelligence aid, which will strengthen its position within the bargaining model with Russia. The U.S. should also consider revising Russia’s draft treaties in order to reach a political compromise. The NATO-Russia Agreement should be revised to maintain NATO’s core structure, with additional concessions that Russia must reciprocate. The U.S.-Russia treaty should remain largely untouched in order to maintain the U.S.’s security level and prevent a negative Russian precedent from being established. This interventionist policy, therefore, is imperative to upholding Ukraine’s status on the global scale, as well as its overall wellbeing.
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Works Cited:
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